Evolution
1.1 Introduction/Background
Speciation
Li et. al [8] defined a species based on a parameter termed the species distance. They were able to measure the genetic difference, the 'distance', between two individuals and, given a subset of the population, the set was considered a species if all the individuals in the set were within a given distance. This distance was termed the species distance.
The article defines a new genetic algorithm, the species conserving genetic algorithm (SCGA). They claim that conserving species in an evolutionary run is useful because individuals with an alternate genetic structure may be beneficial to other individuals in the future.
An example could be a relatively poorly performing individual that gets the fitness score that it does because it tackles a part of the problem that other individuals have ignored. The genetic combination of this alternate individual and a more mainstream individual may well produce offspring that are better than any that would be produced were the poor performing, but alternative genetics, individual to be eliminated early in the evolutionary run.
Elitism offers the advantage that good individuals are guaranteed to be kept in the population. The disadvantages are that premature convergence is encouraged and that often that elite individual will spread throughout the population, thus often eliminating other solutions to a multi-solution problem.
Li et. al consider fitness sharing as a method that may alleviate the problems associated with elitism. However fitness sharing does not guarantee the survival of a genetically alternate individual. Li et. al's method works to keep the advantages of elitism and fitness sharing while guaranteeing the survival of alternate individuals.
Problems
Individuals are normally expected to increase their probability of selection by becoming fitter. However an alternate avenue for success is to decrease the fitness of other individuals. Blair and Pollack [2] , within a framework they called the meta-game of learning, termed these individuals infiltrators and personified them as those who look for opportunities to restrict the performance of their competition. They act in stark contrast to the performers who aimed to improve.
Infiltrators and performers may collude thus limiting the search space and encouraging convergence upon suboptimal solutions. Note that in this way collusion can occur within a population even though the individuals' only interaction is through their genetic material. Blair and Pollack state that this dynamic could well become a problem for evolutionary searches with small populations by causing premature convergence. Techniques to avoid the problem include fitness sharing, hall of fame, shared sampling and coevolution.
Genetic Programming 2 Coevolution
A population can coevolve competitively or cooperatively or both.
Cooperative coevolution requires that a number of individuals work together to solve the problem. Examples of cooperative coevolution are evolving robotic soccer teams, evolving a group of predators, or evolving two separate species that must work together to solve to problem. Cooperation implies communication, be it explicit or implicit.
Competitive coevolution has relative fitness measures rather than absolute fitness. Individuals compete against each other for dominance in the population.
Both cooperation and competition occur when teams of separately evolved individuals compete against each other. Two examples of this are robot soccer (team against team) and some predator prey domains where the predators are groups of individuals (team against individual).
Competitive Coevolution
Competitive coevolution is defined by the fitness function. If the function is dependant on the current population then it is competitive.
Just Two Individuals
Competitive coevolution in its simplest state has just two individuals, a champion and a challenger. A hill-climbing algorithm is used where the challenger represents the new direction. If the challenger is better than the champion then the challenger becomes the champion and a new challenger is chosen.
Samuel's 1959 work on automated learning of checkers strategies [14] is an early example. In his work, the challenger learnt over the course of a checkers game and if its learning made it a better player then it became the champion. If the challenger was a weaker player then a new and fairly drastically different challenger would be found. After just 28 games the learnt strategy was considered better than an average human player.
Pollack, et al. [9] looked at evolving a Backgammon player. They compared their work to that of Tesauro's TD-Gammon with the hypothesis that TD-Gammon's success was not to do with the technology but rather the coevolutionary approach that Tesauro took when combined with the game's nondeterminism as well as the instability of the leader's position within the game. Using these traits, but not the same technology, Pollack, et al. were able to evolve a capable Backgammon player. Their work also used just two individuals, the champion and the challenger. For each generation the challenger which was a slight mutation of the champion.
One Population
Competitive coevolution may be naturally applied to evolutionary systems with single populations. All that is necessary is a concept of "better": when is one individual better than another?
In Juillé and Pollack's work on the intertwined spirals problem [7] they used a single population for coevolution. Diversity was encouraged within the population by a competitive fitness function: points were only given to individuals that correctly answered questions other population members could not. Their hypothesis was that individuals would be promoted for finding niches in the problem domain. Such individuals would not be eliminated from the population until the evolution of a more successful individual that also covered their niche. This hypothesis was shown empirically to be true, under a simplified form of evolution.
Ficici and Pollack, in their bit-string prediction work [5] , also saw the occurrence of these niches. Watson and Pollack [19] perhaps also saw this occurrence when they mentioned "spontaneous speciation".
Angeline and Pollack [1] compared Tic Tac Toe solutions evolved using competitive fitness against those evolved by learning to play against an "expert". The "experts" were perfect, nearly perfect and random, none of which offered sufficient positive feedback for evolving players. The perfect player could not be beaten and thus provided no positive feedback at all. The nearly perfect player allowed only one type of win, so provided only very limited positive feedback. The random player was too easily beaten which eliminated any pressure for the evolution of even slightly complex strategies. On the other hand, when the population was played against itself using tournament fitness, positive feedback was provided and so very good strategies were evolved. An excellent discussion was presented and, at least for the Tic Tac Toe domain, competitive fitness was shown to produce superior individuals.
More than One Population
Hillis's 1992 work on sorting arrays of 16 individuals used two populations.
In Finding Opponents Worth Beating [13] , Rosin and Belew discuss three games: Tic Tac Toe, Nim, and Go. Strategies for all three games were evolved competitively using genetic algorithms with two populations, termed hosts and parasites. It was found that perfect solutions to Tic Tac Toe were easier to evolve than equivalent solutions for Nim.
In Tic Tac Toe the objective of the host population was not to lose (i.e. to either win or draw), while the objective of the parasite population was to win against the hosts. Each individual consisted of a genome with 593 alleles, where each allele represented a unique board configuration. The value assigned to each allele represented which empty square would be the individual's next move. Using two populations, with 400 individuals in each, an optimal Tic Tac Toe solution was found in fewer than 120 generations (about three million games).
The objective in Nim for the host population was to force a win. The game was shown to be significantly more difficult than Tic Tac Toe. Indeed, finding a solution to Nim required two new techniques, competitive fitness sharing and shared sampling. More than 150 million games were required before an optimal solution emerged.
Competitive fitness sharing is very similar to Juillé and Pollack's intertwined spirals work. While they rewarded individuals for each specialisation by competition within one population, Rosin and Belew gave similar rewards using two populations. A host individual's fitness depended on how many parasites it could beat, and how many other hosts could also beat the same parasites. In other words, a host was rewarded for beating parasites that other hosts could not.
An algorithm, called shared sampling, was specified that selected a representative sample of the parasite population in order to reduce the number of competitions required. Shared sampling would select parasites that challenged the greatest variety of hosts. The sample size ranged from 1% to 25% of the parasite population.
Single individual elitism was used to guarantee that a perfect individual stayed in the population.
Competitive Fitness Algorithms
Also in Angeline and Pollack's Tic Tac Toe article [1] is a discussion on algorithms to calculate competitive fitness.
They start by reviewing Axelrod's 1989 work on the iterated prisoners dilemma. For this problem two strategies were needed to play against each other. To assess the ranking of each strategy, Alexrod played every strategy against every other; thus for n strategies there were n 2 competitions. However, as Angeline and Pollack pointed out, as n gets larger, or as the competition becomes more complex, this number of competitions per generation may be prohibitive.
Hillis, in his 1992 work on sorting arrays of 16 integers, also used a competitive fitness function. This function made use of two populations: one to sort the array of numbers and the other to create the array to sort. Angeline and Pollack stated that this method may be unnatural for some problems and that it did not give a ranking for the evolved sorting networks, but that, when compared to Axelrod's full competition, Hillis's function used only n 2 competitions per generation.
Tournament fitness was the method used to assess Angeline and Pollack's Tic Tac Toe players. It is a binary tournament with n − 1 competitions per generation. The result is a partial ordering of the strategies and it requires only one population.
Analysis
The work of Pollack, et al. [9] was discussed in an article by Blair and Pollack [2] one year later. They gave further reasons as to why Backgammon is such an excellent environment to successfully evolve strategies.
As well as the collusion between the infiltrator and the performer, collusion may occur in a coevolutionary setting. Blair and Pollack, within their meta-game of learning framework, discussed a two population scenario for coevolutionary collusion.
Within each population there were infiltrators and performers that colluded with one another. Between populations individuals were also able to collude. Although both positive and negative feedback loops could be established, collusion could occur if the negative feedback was insufficient, or overtaken by the positive.
Backgammon was seen as a good evolutionary domain because:
• It is ergodic: any position can be followed at a later time by any other position.
• It is stochastic: the dice rolls that govern the game are random.
• There is a broad spectrum of opportunity for learning: there are many areas available for improvement during each game.
• The leader's position is unstable: except for the racing stage, the probability of a player winning stays between 15 and 85 percent. This gives the potential to learn from any position.
• It is difficult to collude by taking turns for easy wins or to continually draw.
Blair and Pollack also considered Karl Sims's domain, Evolving Virtual Creatures, and concluded that it too is a good coevolutionary domain because of the above reasons as well as because:
• It is continuous. As there are no arbitrary boundaries collusion is more difficult because specialisation of select areas is naturally extended to competency of the whole area.
Watson and Pollack presented an interesting analysis in Coevolutionary Dynamics in a Minimal Substrate [19] . They considered three "advantages" of coevolutionary learning commonly cited in the literature and they produced examples to demonstrated that these features could easily be more of a problem than an advantage.
The features were:
A gradient for learning
Commonly, it is expected that the competition will continually increase performance because as one side becomes better they give a challenge to the other side, but because the performance increase is incremental, the challenge will always be within the grasp of the other side thus providing an appropriate gradient for learning.
Watson and Pollack showed that it was possible one side could become too advanced, to the point where they would win every competition (i.e. the worst of one side is better than the best of the other side), and that this effect gives a loss of gradient such that all evolutionary pressure is lost and the populations just drift until, if at all, they re-engage and begin once again to race each other.
This negative phenomenon was produced under very limited conditions and seemed to depend on the population sizes and the size of the sample against which each individual was compared.
A relevant focus
By using coevolution it is usually expected that the competition will focus evolutionary improvement on areas that are under-developed. This way a holistic solution is produced.
Watson and Pollack suggested (incorrectly) that by focusing on an opponents weakness degenerate players will be produced that over-specialise on weaknesses. This goes against evolutionary theory because such specialisation would create a pressure on the opponent to improve that area of its ability.
Open-endedness
This is the area that Ficici and Pollack [5] spent some effort considering.
Commonly, a major advantage connected to coevolution is that of openended progress. Watson and Pollack stated that intransitive superiority is often a problem that opposes such open-endedness by allowing the population to "chase its own tail", to suffer no improvement when measured objectively but to appear as if continually improving relatively.
Watson and Pollack showed that intransitive superiority can force performance downwards.
Applications

Cooperative Coevolution
The term cooperative coevolution was coined by Potter and De Jong [10] . Their architecture allowed for cooperating components (species) to evolve in parallel; combined together they produce a whole solution. Each species was genetically isolated from the others and evolved on its own. For evaluation, each species population was considered in turn. Each individual in the population was combined with representatives of the other species so that the combination formed one solution.
This technique encouraged specialisation by each species. So that a species would be considered useful in the combination, evolutionary pressure encouraged species to find a niche that was unique.
Explicit Communication
Cangelosi and Parisi [3] evolved a language between individuals. In their mushroomloving toadstool-hating world, the individuals learnt to communicate which mushrooms were poisonous and which were edible. The communication consisted of a single word from the speaker to the listener. The word was made up of three bits, and although no meaning was imposed on the system, it was found that the population converged (arbitrarily) on two of the eight possible combinations to communicate the binary classification.
In their system the speakers and listeners were selected from the same homogeneous population. The evolution of classification and communication was expected to occur at the same time, although there was a bias towards learning classification first.
To benchmark the evolutionary process, Cangelosi and Parisi evolved the same system but with a human-specified speaker. The speaker had perfect classification abilities and communicated its classification via a specific pair of words. The listeners had effectively the same job-to learn the language and utilise the knowledge-but the language was not changing under evolutionary pressures. This system performed more consistently over the generations but was not specifically better by the end of the evolutionary process.
Cangelosi and Parisi (suspiciously) concluded that language is a natural byproduct of cognition.
Analysis
[6]
Applications
Sklar, et al. [16] used co-evolutionary learning to create a computer-based tutor. They saw learning as a mutual task carried out between the human student and the computer tutor. One must learn the material and the other must learn how to present the material.
Although they claimed success, a number of concerns exist. Their work centred around a classroom of 22 primary school students who learned from 64 computer tutors. Firstly, an evolving population of just 64 individuals is very small and likely to be fraught with problems such as premature convergence. Secondly, the first problem is compounded by the accuracy of the fitness testing of each individual. Each student assesses ten tutors, and given the attention span of a primary school student, how much time can be put into accurate assessment of each tutor? Thirdly, how many generations are used to evolve the tutors? With such a small population a large number of generations would be required. Finally, I feel these issues have been avoided by keeping to the relatively simple tutoring problem of basic arithmetic.
Competitive and Cooperative Coevolution
Analysis
Ficici and Pollack [5] also analysed coevolutionary learning. They created a bitstring predicting domain that allowed analysis of open-endedness, competitive arms races and mediocre stable states.
They created their domain so that they were able to apply information theory to assist analysis. Concepts of entropy and order were used to discuss success rates and sophistication of individuals.
In their experiments they hoped to be able to analyse what makes certain coevolutionary setups more successful than others.
They showed that, for their domain, the fitness test could significantly effect results. In one experiment they considered absolute performance while in another they considered only performance above a minimum threshold, that of a random strategy. Performance above random, which gives minimal scores to poor performers, was found to improve the overall success of the individuals. Absolute performance was shown to settle in a suboptimal loop of "convention chasing", a mediocre stable state.
Ficici and Pollack said that their domain, which involved evolutionary pressure from both hostile (competitive) and friendly (cooperative) members of the game, was able to produce increasingly complex individuals indefinitely-openended progress.
Unfortunately it was also shown that the fitness test that measured performance above random also settled in a mediocre stable state, albeit more complex. Thus no environment was demonstrated that produced open-ended success.
They concluded that their domain allowed significant analysis. However, as open-endedness is the most interesting potential of coevolutionary learning, and given that open-endedness was not demonstrated, and that their domain is not very exciting, I feel I'll ignore their work.
Applications
Environmental Coevolution 3 Communication
In their review, Cao et. al, state "it is widely claimed that decentralised architectures have several inherent advantages over centralised architectures, including fault tolerance, natural exploitation of parallelism, reliability, and scalability." However they say "we are not aware of any published empirical of theoretical comparison that supports these claims directly." Finally, "it is not clear whether the scaling properties of decentralisation offset the coordinative advantage of centralised systems." [4] 
Evolving Communication
In the literature there are plenty of examples of artificially evolved forms of communication. Luc Steels is particularly active in the field of explicit communication. He has successfully evolved phonologies, feature detectors and lexicons for his agents to play discrimination games [17] . He even considered the evolution of syntax in language. 
Explicit Communication
Cooperation
One dictionary definition of cooperation considers that it must be mutually beneficial. In Cao et. al [4] they consider three components for their definition: "the task, the mechanism of cooperation, and system performance". Thus "given some task specified by a designer, a multiple-robot system displays cooperative behaviour if, due to some underlying mechanism, there is an increase in the total utility of the system." They continue to explain that a non-cooperative system has a utility even under "naive collective behaviour" and that cooperation is measured by the extension of this utility. Though just how you would measure the utility of "naive collective behaviour" and then the "increase under cooperation" is not discussed.
In their review of cooperative robotics research, Cao et. al [4] consider that the field needs to create a more precise definition of what cooperation means. They state that "formal metrics for cooperation and system performance are missing fro the literature".
Despite the cognitive abilities of insects being exceptionally limited, they still manage to perform complex tasks in the real world. Their examples of emergent behaviour are often taken as motivation for cooperative robotics [4, page 16] .
In May 2002, Quinn et. al [12] reported that their work was the first successful application of evolution to a real multi-robot control problem. Three homogeneous robots were moved in formation using, as sensors, just four ambiguous infrared transceivers per robot.
They concluded their article by suggesting that a similar problem had been tackled by hand-programming, and that the author of that work had decided a solution wasn't possible within the confines of the problem.
It is quite possible to develop cooperative behaviour without any signs of communication. Sen et. al [15] used reinforcement learning to generate two boxpushing individuals that learned to cooperate, despite not sharing information, nor even knowing about the other's existence. This is not a terribly surprising result. The individuals would have learned a "dance", in that, given a certain position, an individual would respond in a very set manner. Such a solution is very fragile and would work successfully only with those it trained with. Such dances were documented by Trenaman [18] .
Cooperation without Communication
Some authors say that communication is not required for cooperation.
Cao et. al [4] reference two authors whose work is "particularly interesting in that cooperation can be achieved without the robots even knowing of each others' existence." However on the following page Cao et. al make clear that, in their opinion, communication through the environment does not constitute communication at all. Interestingly, they then perceived a possible problem with their definition of cooperation.
Cooperation With Shared Knowledge
Prencipe and Gervasi's article, On the Intelligent Behaviour of Stupid Robots [11] , describes the minimum knowledge requirements for a group of robots to perform cooperative tasks.
The two models that they consider are both very simple, but they argue that within them, "a surprisingly large class of problems can be stated". They model robots as points on a Cartesian plane.
For one problem, forming an arbitrary pattern with the robots, they give four theoretical results. The assumptions range from a shared coordinate system, sharing a single axis, and sharing nothing. For each assumption they specify what further knowledge is required before pattern formation is possible.
As well as pattern formation Prencipe and Gervasi give similar theoretical results for homing, gathering, following, flocking, and capturing behaviours. They note that spreading and exploration are two other behaviours that would be interesting for future study.
Future Work
Cao et. al citecao97cooperative note a number of areas where cooperative robotics research might continue, two of these areas are interesting. The first is in the definitions and metrics of cooperation; how is cooperation defined and measured? The second is "incorporation of recent ideas in distributed control to achieve oblivious cooperation, or cooperation without communication." (page 17).
